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THE COURT OF APPEAL’S LACK OF JURISDICTION
TO REOPEN APPEALS
Abdullah bin A Rahman v Public Prosecutor1
Lim Choon Chye v Public Prosecutor2
IT is ironic that Abdullah bin A Rahman v PP and Lim Choon Chye v
PP were decided in the aftermath of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four
and Maguire Seven3 cases from the United Kingdom. As in these cases,
Abdullah and Lim Choon Chye highlight a serious flaw in our criminal
justice system: there appears to be no appropriate way to correct miscarriages
of justice. The purpose of this case note is to set out the conclusions reached
by the Court of Appeal and to suggest directions for the future.
Both Abdullah and Lim Choon Chye involved applicants who were
convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death.4 Their appeals were
dismissed by the Court of Appeal.5 In Abdullah, the applicant was convicted
of abetting one Abdul Rashid bin Mohammed in drug trafficking. Both he
and Abdul Rashid were sentenced to death and lost their appeals. But before
execution, Abdul Rashid told the applicant that his statement to the In-
vestigating Officer as well as his testimony in court implicating the applicant
were fabricated. In Lim Choon Chye, the applicant alleged that while awaiting
execution he met a fellow prisoner on death row for drug trafficking in
an unconnected case who imparted certain information to him substantiating
the defence raised at his trial. The applicants in both cases then tried by
criminal motion to adduce these matters as fresh evidence to the Court of
Appeal, although their appeals had been heard and disposed of.
Thus the main issue raised in both applications was whether the Court
of Appeal had any jurisdiction to reopen an appeal in the light of fresh
evidence. The court concluded that it did not possess such jurisdiction. The
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following discussion sets out the arguments and the decisions in Abdullah
and Lim Choon Chye.
The Applicants’ Arguments
The main argument raised by the applicants6 was that sections 29A(2) and
29A(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act7 (“SCJA”) should be read
widely to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal to reopen appeals if
justice demands it. The sections read:
29A(2). The criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal shall consist
of appeals against any decision made by the High Court in the exercise
of its original criminal jurisdiction, subject nevertheless to the pro-
visions of this Act or any other written law regulating the terms and
conditions upon which such appeals may be brought.
29A(4). The Court of Appeal shall, for the purposes of and subject
to the provisions of this Act, have full power to determine any question
necessary to be determined for the purpose of doing justice in any
case before the Court. [Emphasis added.]
In relation to this interpretation, the applicants argued8 that the case of
R v Pinfold9 should not be applied in Singapore. This case involved the
interpretation of section 1(1) of the UK Criminal Appeal Act 1968 which
reads: “[a] person convicted of an offence on indictment may appeal to
the Court of Appeal against his conviction.” The English Court of Appeal
pointed out that the provision must be read against the background that
it is in the public interest to have finality in legal proceedings. The court
found no situation where a right of appeal couched in similar terms had
been construed as a right to pursue more than one appeal in a case. Hence
the court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain additional evidence
in a situation where it had disposed of the appeal.
The applicants stressed that the English and Singapore systems of
criminal appeal are different. Under section 17 of the UK Criminal Appeal
Act 1968 appellants have recourse to executive intervention in the form
of a reference by the Home Secretary to the Court of Appeal, even after
an unsuccessful appeal has been made:
6 Abdullah, supra, note 1, at 131; Lim Choon Chye, supra, note 2, at 137.
7 Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed.
8 Abdullah, supra, note 1, at 132; Lim Choon Chye, supra, note 2, at 137-8.
9 [1988] 1 QB 462 (CA).
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17(1) Where a person has been convicted on indictment, or been tried
on indictment and found not guilty by reason of insanity, or been found
by a jury to be under a disability and to have done the act or made
the omission charged against him, the Secretary of State may, if he
thinks fit, at any time either –
(a) refer the whole case to the Court of Appeal and the case
shall then be treated for all purposes as an appeal to the
court by that person; or
(b) if he desires the assistance of the court on any point arising
in the case, refer that point to the court for their opinion
thereon, and the court shall consider the point so referred
and furnish the Secretary of State with their opinion thereon
accordingly.
(2) A reference by the Secretary of State under this section may be
made by him either on an application by the person referred to in
subsection (1), or without any such application.
Since there was no equivalent to section 17 in the SCJA, the applicants
argued, Singapore courts should not be constrained by the English position
in Pinfold where a right of appeal is construed to mean a right to one appeal
in any one case.
This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. In Lim Choon Chye
the court expressed the view that:
there is no indication in them [sections 29A(2) and 29A(4) of the SCJA]
of Parliament’s intention to allow an applicant an indefinitely extended
right of appeal in the sense of being able to pursue a second appeal
even after his first has been duly heard and dismissed. As a matter
of procedure, once the Court of Appeal has rendered judgment in an
appeal heard by it, it is functus officio as far as that appeal is concerned.10
Like its English counterpart,11 the Singapore Court of Appeal is a creature
of legislation, and so its jurisdiction is necessarily defined solely by and
10 Lim Choon Chye, supra, note 2, at 137.
11 The English Court of Appeal has no inherent jurisdiction apart from statute: R v Jeffries
[1969] 1 QB 120 (CA); R v Collins [1970] 1 QB 710 (CA); R v Shannon [1975] AC 717
(HL), R v McIlkenny & Ors [1992] 2 All ER 417 at 424h-j (CA) (Birmingham Six case)
and R v Maguire & Ors [1992] QB 936 at 944G (CA) (Maguire Seven case).
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [1994]434
limited to the provisions of the SCJA.12 The court pointed out13 that section
29A(4) is merely concerned with the Court of Appeal’s power when it already
has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. This occurs only (1) if a case
is on appeal from the High Court (section 44 of the SCJA); (2) if the High
Court or Public Prosecutor reserves any question for the Court of Appeal’s
determination after a conviction by the High Court in the exercise of its
original criminal jurisdiction (section 59); or (3) if the High Court reserves
for the Court of Appeal’s decision any question of law of public interest
(section 60). This is borne out by the concluding words of section 29A(4),
“in any case before the Court”, which assumes a situation where the Court
of Appeal is already seised of the matter by virtue of sections 29A(2), 44,
59 and 60.
The court also noted14 that it is not true that in Singapore an appellant
who wishes to adduce fresh evidence in his case after the dismissal of his
appeal has no further recourse or remedy, since a petition for clemency
lies to the President of the Republic of Singapore pursuant to section 8
of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act.15 It concluded that Pinfold
should be followed because the policy of having finality and stability of
legal proceedings is common to all legal systems and not confined to the
English system.
The applicant in Lim Choon Chye tried to argue that the Court of Appeal
had in fact exercised its jurisdiction to reopen an appeal in the unreported
decision of Ng Teo Chye v PP.16 In that case, after his conviction, the
defendant filed notice to the effect that he did not intend to appeal. But
following the successful appeal of a co-accused he changed his mind and
sought to bring an appeal out of time pursuant to section 50 of the SCJA,
which was allowed. The Court of Appeal distinguished Ng Teo Chye from
the present applications because in that case no appeal had been heard by
the Court of Appeal prior to his application.
In addition to sections 29A(2) and 29A(4), counsel for the applicant in
Abdullah relied on section 55(1) of the SCJA, which reads:
12 See Wong Hong Toy v PP [1986] 1 MLJ 453, cited in Lim Choon Chye, supra, note 2,
at 139.
13 Abdullah, supra, note 1, at 132-3.
14 Lim Choon Chye, supra, note 2, at 138.
15 Act 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev Ed. In Abdullah, supra, note 1, at 133, the Court of Appeal also
held that it had no jurisdiction to make a recommendation on the present application to
the President for clemency. A recommendation was only possible if the Court of Appeal
was actually hearing the matter on appeal. In the present case, the court was unable to assume
jurisdiction and thus would not be going into the merits of the case and hearing new
evidence.
16 Criminal Motion No 3 of 1994, 15 March 1994, as gleaned from Lim Choon Chye, supra,
note 2, at 138-9. The point is also mentioned in passing in Ng Teo Chye v PP, CRA 5
of 1994, 31 May 1994.
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In dealing with any appeal, the Court of Appeal may, if it thinks
additional evidence is necessary, either take such evidence itself or
direct it to be taken by the trial court. [Emphasis added.]
Counsel contended17 that the word “any” should be given a liberal in-
terpretation so as to embrace any matter before the court provided the interests
of justice so demanded, even though section 55(1) appears in Part V of
the SCJA (“Criminal Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal”).
This argument was also rejected by the Court of Appeal, which felt that
section 55(1) does not allow the court to receive fresh evidence at any time.
The provisions preceding and subsequent to section 55(1) (ie, sections 45
to 58) of the SCJA deal with the machinery and effect when an appeal
is set in motion as well as the powers which the court can exercise on
the hearing of such an appeal. Section 55(1), being one of these provisions,
only gives the Court of Appeal power to receive additional evidence where
it already has jurisdiction over the matter. The court felt this interpretation
was fortified by the words “in dealing with any appeal” in section 55(1).
By no stretch of the imagination could an application such as the present
one be considered an appeal.
Abdullah and Lim Choon Chye are undoubtedly correct in law in deciding
that the Singapore Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to reopen an appeal
in order to receive fresh evidence which emerge after an appeal has been
heard and disposed of. The court found that no provision of the SCJA confers
such jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal; and in the interests of finality
in legal proceedings it was of the view that it is undesirable for applicants
to have an uncontrolled right to petition the court repeatedly after the due
determination of their appeals. But it is submitted that the present situation
is highly inadequate because there is no satisfactory process by which
miscarriages of justice can be corrected.
Reception of English Law Via Section 5 of the
Criminal Procedure Code
There is one possible solution, not canvassed in Abdullah or Lim Choon
Chye, which does not require legislative intervention. It is found in section
5 of the Criminal Procedure Code18 (“CPC”) which reads:
As regards matters of criminal procedure for which no special provision
has been made by this Code or by any other law for the time being
in force in Singapore the law relating to criminal procedure for the
17 Abdullah, supra, note 1, at 131.
18 Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed.
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time being in force in England shall be applied so far as the procedure
does not conflict or is not inconsistent with this Code and can be made
auxiliary thereto.
Section 5 allows the reception of the English law19 of criminal pro-
cedure20 on issues where Singapore law is silent.21 Ordinarily, when leg-
islation is codified it is meant to be exhaustive. The CPC is unusual in
this respect as any gap in criminal procedure in Singapore is to be made
up for by reference to prevailing English law.22
It is not easy to determine when there are “matters of criminal procedure
for which no special provision has been made by this Code or by any other
law for the time being in force in Singapore.” For example, there may exist
English procedural rules governing a particular stage in the criminal justice
process, while the CPC is silent on the point. However, there may be no
lacuna because the Singapore legislature has in fact decided not to adopt
the relevant English law. In such a case, the English procedural rules should
not be imported. Reported cases suggest that to determine whether Parliament
intends to act in this manner, policy considerations are important.23
19 PP v Yeoh Thean Hock [1962] MLJ 258 (HC, Penang) (s 5 cannot be used to apply the
law relating to criminal procedure in the Federated Malay States Criminal Procedure Code
if there is a lacuna in the Straits Settlements Criminal Procedure Code).
20 Ng Kwee Piow v R [1960] MLJ 278 at 279G (CCA, Singapore) (provisions relating to
evidence cannot be applied via s 5).
21 Section 5 imports rules of criminal procedure contained in both statute law (eg, Lam Heng
v R [1937] MLJ 154; Dickinson v PP [1955] MLJ 191 (HC, Kuala Lumpur); PP v Wee
Eh Tiang [1956] MLJ 120)) and common law (eg, Tan Boon Hock v PP [1979] 1 MLJ
236 (FC, Malaysia); Ong Lai Kim v PP [1991] 3 MLJ 111 (HC, Kuala Lumpur); Ibrahim
bin Masod v PP [1993] 3 SLR 873 (CA, Singapore)). Mere legal ‘conventions’ or ‘devices’
do not constitute “law relating to criminal procedure”: Ansell v R [1952] MLJ 143 at 144
(HC, Penang).
22 This may be undesirable from the point of view of legal autochthony, but as Sharma J
remarked pointedly in PP v Sanassi [1970] 2 MLJ 198 at 201-2: “It is entirely a matter
for the legislature to decide whether the procedure of the courts in this country, which is
now sovereign and independent, should depend on a foreign enactment and whether any
amendment made to its own laws by a foreign Government should still continue to remain
binding on us who have a supreme legislature of our own.” Parliament has now taken heed:
infra, note 31, and the accompanying text.
23 Two examples illustrate this point: in Kulwant v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 10 (HC, Singapore),
the court concluded it has no jurisdiction to compel the Public Prosecutor to furnish the
accused with a copy of a statement he made to the police, unless it is exercising original
criminal jurisdiction or appellate, revisionary, supervisory or other jurisdiction under a
specific statutory provision. Policy: any other view frustrates criminal proceedings since
the accused can make successive applications with or without justification and even appeal
to the High Court on refusal, thus delaying proceedings. English law is not applicable since
there is no lacuna in the CPC which makes it necessary to resort to it.
In Karpal Singh v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544 (SC, Kuala Lumpur), members of the subordinate
judiciary were held not to have an inherent power to strike out proceedings to prevent abuse
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Section 5 is a mandatory section: when Singapore law does not provide
for particular matters of criminal procedure, English law shall be applied.
One issue that arises is the extent to which English rules may be modified
to suit local circumstances. For instance, relevant English procedural rules
may refer to legal mechanisms which are not available in Singapore. Can
such rules be applied by modifying them to refer to analogous mechanisms
which do exist locally? It is submitted that the phrase “can be made auxiliary
thereto” confers on the court a power to adjust English rules. In any case,
local judges have not demurred from so acting where public policy demands
it.24
The Singapore legislature could not have decided against adopting section
17 of the UK Criminal Appeals Act 1968 as part of our criminal procedure,
since the CPC was enacted much earlier in 1900.25 Abdullah and Lim Choon
Chye, therefore, demonstrate that there is a lacuna in Singapore criminal
procedure. It is thus possible to argue that section 17 applies to Singapore
via section 5 of the CPC. It is also submitted that the legal machinery to
implement the section exists in Singapore. Section 17 confers the power
to refer cases to the Court of Appeal on the Secretary of State, who in
this case is the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom. The Home
Secretary is in effect the United Kingdom’s Minister of the Interior,
with responsibilities over the police force; the penal system and the treatment
of offenders; and prisons, custodial institutions and the probation service.
of process because the CPC is exhaustive as regards summary trial procedure. Policy: it
is “absurd and against common sense” to believe that the legislature expects members of
the subordinate judiciary to exercise such vast powers trespassing into the Attorney-
General’s area. The English doctrine of inherent jurisdiction was not applied.
24 In Husdi v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 80 (FC, Malaysia), the issue was whether the accused was
entitled to a copy of a witness’ statement to the police so that he could impeach the witness’
credibility. Such a power had been formerly given by s 113(ii) of the CPC, but this had
been deleted. The court found that since other sections of the CPC allowed the credit of
witnesses to be impeached by proving that their testimony was inconsistent with former
statements made by them, the accused was entitled to a copy of the witness’ police statement.
However, the court modified the relevant English procedural rule (which required the
prosecution to disclose the statement directly to the defence) such that the court was to
look at the witness’ statement first and to order a copy to be supplied to the accused only
if it was “expedient in the interest of justice”. In effect, this revived the repealed s 113(ii).
Policy: Malaysian witnesses are afraid of reprisals, and if the prosecution is obliged to supply
copies of police statements without the court’s intervention, they will be more reluctant
to give evidence to incriminate their fellows.
25 Criminal Procedure Code 1900 (No 21 of 1900). See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Of codes
and ideology: Some notes on the origins of the major criminal enactments of Singapore”
(1989) 31 Mal LR 46 at 66. The Singapore Code was in turn based on the Indian Criminal
Procedure Code, which first appeared as Indian Act XXV of 1861. A consolidation took
place in Indian Act V of 1898: MP Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History (3rd ed, 1972),
at 569-70; AR Biswas, BB Mitra on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974)
(15th ed, 1978), vol 1 at 16.
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He or she is also broadly responsible for the administration and reform
of the criminal law.26 Since the Home Secretary’s responsibilities generally
correspond to those of the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Law
in Singapore, the court can exercise its power to read section 17 as referring
to either Minister.
However, on policy grounds it is preferable for Parliament not to rely
on section 5 of the CPC. Instead, it should consider the whole issue carefully
and enact remedial provisions. The recent abolition of appeals to the Privy
Council27 and the enactment of the Application of English Law Act,28 which
abolishes reception of English statutes under the Second Charter of Justice
1826 and English mercantile law under section 5 of the Civil Law Act,29
show that Singapore is taking bold steps towards legal autochthony by
cutting ties with English law. During Parliamentary debates on the Second
Reading of the Application of English Law Bill, the then Law and Home
Affairs Minister Professor S Jayakumar said:
We must have certainty in our laws and move away from reliance
on English law, because we do not know what are the conditions and
circumstances which presently shape the enactment of laws in the
United Kingdom.30
Member of Parliament Mr Davinder Singh reminded Professor Jayakumar
of other statutes which had clauses applying English law to Singapore, in
particular section 5 of the CPC. Professor Jayakumar intimated that steps
were being taken to modify this statute and other laws which import changes
in British law to Singapore.31
26 de Smith & Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Rodney Brazier ed, 6th ed,
1989), at 383-4. See also Colin F Padfield, British Constitution (7th ed, 1987), at 151-2
and ECS Wade & AW Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law (AW Bradley, KD
Ewing & T St JN Bates eds, 11th ed, 1993), at 399-400.
27 By the Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No 2 of 1994) which repealed the Judicial
Committee Act (Cap 148, 1985 Rev Ed). As a result, the Court of Appeal no longer holds
itself bound by any previous decisions of its own or of the Privy Council if this causes
injustice in a particular case or constrains the development of the law in conformity with
the circumstances of Singapore: Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 2 SLR 689.
28 Cap 7A, 1994 Ed.
29 Cap 43, 1988 Ed.
30 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol 61, 12 October 1993, col 616.
31 Ibid, cols 615-6. See also “English Law Bill: More Laws Here to be Amended” The Straits
Times, 13 October 1993 at 17.
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Conferring Jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal
If we are to rely on legislation to address the issue, the simplest way would
be to amend the SCJA to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal to
reopen appeals where appropriate. However, this suggestion is problematic.
As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Abdullah,32 its main function is a
supervisory one, to review and correct the decisions of lower courts, with
the additional function of determining questions of law of public importance.
It does not have the manpower nor resources to screen the flood of petitions
which will surely result if new jurisdiction is conferred on it.33 The Home
Office in Britain receives 700-800 applications a year claiming a wrongful
conviction and urging it to exercise its powers under section 17 of the
Criminal Appeals Act 1968 (the 1992 figure was 790).34 This works out
to roughly 60-70 cases a month. The Registrar of the Supreme Court recently
revealed that Court of Appeal judges already have to hear and dispose of
about 30 appeals a month, while the Chief Justice has to manage an additional
30 Magistrate’s appeals in this period.35 The Second Report on the Maguire
Case, which will be referred to in greater depth below, also points out that
the English Court of Appeal does not have the authority nor the necessary
expertise to initiate, let alone control, investigations that will need to be
carried out if it takes on the role of rectifying miscarriages of justice.36
The same is probably true of our Court of Appeal.
Ministerial Power to Refer Cases to the Court of Appeal
A more tenable solution would be to insert a provision equivalent to section
17 of the UK Criminal Appeals Act 1968 into the SCJA, conferring power
on either the Minister of Home Affairs or the Minister of Law to refer
deserving cases to the Court of Appeal, on his own initiative or if cases
are brought to his notice through petitions by appellants or members of
the public. Such references to the Court of Appeal should be treated for
all purposes as an ordinary appeal.
32 Supra, note 1, at 133.
33 For an opposing view, see the letter “Enact law to give Court of Appeal discretionary powers
to re-open cases” by Tin Keng Seng to The Straits Times, 20 July 1994 at 30.
34 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, infra, note 42, at 181 para 5. The Commission found
it reasonable to suppose that if a new authority were set up to deal with such applications,
the number of cases put to it by persons claiming to be victims of miscarriages of justice
would be at least of the same order, and might at first be substantially more: ibid, at 185
para 23.
35 Chiam Boon Keng, “Total recording of court proceedings not practical” The Straits Times,
30 August 1994 at 29.
36 Infra, note 42, at 93-4 para 12.25.
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However, two inquiries set up in the wake of the Birmingham Six,
Guildford Four and Maguire Seven cases considered and found the power
of the Home Secretary under section 17 ineffective. In these cases, the
accused persons were convicted of various offences including murder
resulting from bomb explosions set off by the Irish Republican Army in
Birmingham, Guildford and Woolwich. Their appeals were dismissed. The
accused persons continued to protest their innocence, alleging that the
convictions were based on forced confessions and shaky scientific evidence.
Repeated petitions were made to the Home Secretary but to no avail. Finally,
after strong public support for their cause, the cases were referred to the
Court of Appeal which found the previous convictions unsafe and quashed
them. Most of the accused persons had spent between 14 and 16 years in
prison.37
On 19 October 1989 the Home Secretary and Attorney-General ap-
pointed the Rt Hon Sir John May to hold a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances leading to and deriving from the trials of the Guildford Four
and Maguire Seven. In his Second Report on the Maguire Case,38 Sir John
May found that although section 17 appeared unrestricted and on its face
seemed to give the Home Secretary an unfettered discretion to refer cases
to the Court of Appeal “if he thinks fit”, in practice he and the civil servants
advising him operated within strict self-imposed limits. There were con-
stitutional reasons behind this policy – the Home Office, being a branch
of the executive, was naturally wary of interfering in what it saw as matters
for the courts. It was not for the Home Secretary to seek to set aside a
verdict laid down by the Court of Appeal simply because he or others had
come to a different conclusion about an accused’s guilt. Hence, the Home
Secretary treated his power under section 17 as exceptional and only to
be used if there was fresh evidence or new considerations of substance
in the case. A case was not referred if in the Home Secretary’s view there
was no real likelihood of the Court of Appeal taking a different view than
on the original appeal.39
37 Birmingham Six case: see R v McIlkenny & Ors [1992] 2 All ER 417 (CA) and Christopher
Mullin, Error of Judgment (Rev ed, 1990). Guildford Four case: see R v Richardson &
Ors, the Times, 20 October 1989 at 33; G McKee & R Francy, Time Bomb (1988) and
the intense personal account in Gerry Conlon’s book Proved Innocent (1990). Maguire Seven
case: see R v Maguire & Ors [1992] QB 936 (CA) and Sir John May, Interim Report on
the Convictions on 4th March 1976 of the Maguire Family and Others for Offences under
Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (HC 556, 1990), at 9-27.
38 Sir John May, Second Report on the Convictions on 4th March 1976 of the Maguire Family
and Others for Offences Under Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (HC 296,
1992).
39 Ibid, at 49-50 paras 10.3-10.5.
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Sir John May felt that these internal guidelines resulted in the Home
Office taking a “substantially restricted” view of cases such as the Maguire
Seven case. The criteria left no room for references based on “lurking doubts”
felt by officers or Ministers due to such matters as the improbability of
facts or weakness of evidence at the trial in the absence of fresh evidence
or new considerations of substance.40 The Home Office was essentially
reactive and not proactive – it only responded to representations made in
relation to particular convictions rather than carried out its own inves-
tigations into cases based on the trial evidence. While it was wrong to
criticise the Home Office for this approach since it was not normally its
function to conduct independent inquiries, the need for changes in the law
was evident.
A Criminal Cases Review Authority
Sir John May concluded his report by recommending that some alternative
machinery be set up in place of the Home Secretary’s power under section
17 of the Criminal Appeals Act 1968.41 This was taken up by the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice which was formed to examine the criminal
justice system from police investigations to the stage when an accused’s
rights of appeal are exhausted. In its report,42 the Commission cited Sir
John May’s report on the Home Secretary’s self-imposed restrictions and
agreed that the role assigned to the Home Secretary by section 17 was
incompatible with the constitutional separation of powers between the
judiciary and executive.43 It therefore recommended the creation of a body
independent of both the executive and judiciary, and suggested that it be
called the Criminal Cases Review Authority. This Authority, presided over
by lawyers as well as lay persons, would have powers to hear applications
for review of appeals disposed of, to initiate further investigations by directing
and supervising the police to follow up lines of inquiry, and to refer cases
to the Court of Appeal if miscarriages of justice were suspected.44 The
Commission recommended that while the Authority should be accountable
to Parliament, it should have full operational freedom so that it would be
seen to act independently.
The crux of the problem raised by Abdullah and Lim Choon Chye is
how to strike a balance between the need for finality of judgment, and a
40 Ibid, at 88 para 12.4.
41 Ibid, at 93-94 paras 12.24-12.25.
42 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (Cm 2263, 1993) (Chairman: Viscount
Runciman of Doxford).
43 Ibid, at 181-2 paras 6-11.
44 Ibid, at 182 para 11.
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [1994]442
procedure to rectify miscarriages of justice. A Criminal Cases Review
Authority contributes towards the solution by providing a process for
screening applications. Only those with merit will be forwarded to the
Court of Appeal for consideration. This ensures that the Court of Appeal
is not flooded with frivolous applications. Furthermore, the Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Justice, aware of the need to shield the Authority itself
from such claims, recommended that there be no right of appeal or right
to judicial review from a decision of the Authority, although the Authority
should be free to consider a case more than once if appropriate. Naturally,
applicants would only stand a better chance of success if they could present
fresh evidence or arguments.45 But we must be realistic. Even if an Authority
were to be set up with safeguards to prevent abuse, it will have to deal
with many undeserving claims. However, finality of judgment and practical
considerations alone cannot be an excuse to deny justice to guiltless victims
of the system.
It is only fair to point out that, to date, this recommendation of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice has not been implemented in the United
Kingdom. Nonetheless, it is submitted that because of the theoretical and
practical shortcomings of the other suggestions, an independent body to
take charge of investigating and filtering cases for reference to the Court
of Appeal has much to recommend it.
Nature of the President’s Power of Pardon
The Court of Appeal pointed out in Lim Choon Chye46 that appellants wishing
to adduce fresh evidence after their appeals have been dismissed have
recourse to a petition for clemency to the President under section 8 of the
Republic of Singapore Independence Act.47 Such petitions are considered
by the Cabinet, which advises the President in the exercise of his power
of pardon.48
But the power of pardon has significant shortcomings as a tool for
45 Ibid, at 184 para 19.
46 Supra, note 2, at 138.
47 Supra note 15.
48 See s 8(1) of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act: “The President, as occasion
shall arise, may on the advice of Cabinet, ... grant to any offender convicted of any offence
in any court in Singapore, a pardon, free or subject to lawful conditions, or any reprieve
or respite, either indefinite or for such period as the President may think fit, of the execution
of any sentence pronounced on such offender....” [Emphasis added.] Section 8(2) provides
that if an accused is sentenced to death and his appeal has been dismissed, the President
shall cause the reports of the case by the trial judge and appellate judges to be forwarded
to the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is to give an opinion on the case and forward
it with the reports to the Cabinet so that it can advise the President on the use of
his prerogative.
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correcting miscarriages of justice. Firstly, the Cabinet, on receiving a
petition for clemency, is unable to assess the evidence fully. Only courts
are in a position to do so since they have the machinery and processes
to hear new arguments and call witnesses to give fresh evidence, subjecting
the testimony to scrutiny under cross-examination.49 Secondly, a pardon
only excuses an accused person from punishment. It does not operate to
quash his or her conviction.50 Case law suggests that this is unacceptable
to the family and friends of defendants, who are often intent on clearing
their names even though the defendants themselves may already have been
executed or have died during imprisonment. In the Maguire Seven case,51
although Patrick “Guiseppe” Conlon died in prison in 1980 while serving
his sentence, his family sought to have his conviction quashed by petitioning
the Home Secretary to refer a question to the Court of Appeal on whether
the court had the power to consider a reference of a case of a deceased
person under section 17 of the UK Criminal Appeals Act 1968. The court
held that there was no compelling reason why section 17 should be confined
to living persons, and that it would be anomalous if the convictions of the
other members of the Maguire Seven were quashed but Conlon’s was not.
Similar considerations prompted Pamala Bentley to seek the court’s
assistance for a posthumous pardon for her brother Derek in R v Secretary
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley,52 although no attempt
was made to have his conviction quashed. Derek Bentley was convicted
of the fatal shooting of a police officer. The prosecution’s case was that
he was engaged in a joint criminal enterprise: his accomplice had fired
the gun while he had shouted, “Let him have it, Chris.” Bentley had a mental
state just about the level of a feebleminded person. Despite widespread
protests and against the advice of civil servants, the Home Secretary, who
exercises the prerogative of mercy on the Crown’s behalf, refused to
reprieve him. Bentley was hanged. In stark contrast, his accomplice, aged
16 at the time, was too young to be sentenced to death and was merely
detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure. On a petition for a posthumous pardon,
the Home Secretary reviewed the case but concluded that there were no
grounds for recommending a free pardon. Pamala Bentley then sought
49 See the comments in “Appeal Court ‘should have power to reopen cases’”, The Straits Times,
15 July 1994 at 32 and “Enact law to give Court of Appeal discretionary powers to re-
open cases”, The Straits Times, 20 July 1994 at 30.
50 Chiow Thiam Guan v Superintendent of Pudu Prison [1983] 2 MLJ 116 at 118 col 2I (FC,
Malaysia): “To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive
power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment but does not alter it qua judgment.”
See also R v Foster [1985] QB 115 (CA); Philip v DPP of Trinidad and Tobago [1992]
1 All ER 665 (PC).
51 R v Maguire & Ors [1992] QB 936 (CA).
52 [1994] 2 WLR 101 (Div Ct).
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judicial review of this decision. The court held that there was no objection
in principle to the grant of a posthumous conditional pardon where a death
sentence had already been carried out. Since the Home Secretary had not
given sufficient consideration to the possibility of granting a form of pardon
suitable to the circumstances of the case, he should consider afresh whether
it would be just to exercise the prerogative of mercy in a way as to
acknowledge the generally accepted view that Bentley should have been
reprieved. The Home Secretary eventually recommended the grant of a
pardon limited to sentence.53
The fact that pardons have no effect on convictions is even more relevant
to accused persons who have been sentenced not to death but to lesser
punishments such as caning or imprisonment. They are freed from the
penalties imposed on them but not exonerated of the crimes they are wrongly
accused of. A pardon does not erase the stigma and shame of being labelled
and denounced as a criminal.54 A heavy sense of injustice would certainly
weigh on such accused persons and on the public conscience.
Whether the President’s power of pardon may be judicially reviewed
has not been considered in Singapore, but the prevailing Malaysian position
is that the power of pardon is not reviewable.55 In Malaysia, the power
of pardon is considered a prerogative power of the sovereign just as it is
53 Ibid, at 114G.
54
“Sentencing amounts to the use of state coercion against a person for committing an offence.
The sanction may take the form of some deprivation, restriction, or positive obligation.
Deprivations and obligations are fairly widespread in social contexts.... But when imposed
as a sentence, there is the added element of condemnation, labelling, or censure of the
offender.” This has “direct personal and indirect social effects” which call for justification:
Andrew Ashworth, “Sentencing” in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Mike Maguire,
Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner eds, 1994), at 819.
55 PP v Soon Seng Sia Heng [1979] 2 MLJ 170 at 171 col 2F-G (FC); Chiow Thiam Guan
v Superintendent of Pudu Prison [1983] 2 MLJ 116 at 119 col 1B-D (FC); Sim Kie Chon
v Superintendent of Pudu Prison [1985] 2 MLJ 385 at 386 col 2B-F (SC, Kuala Lumpur);
Superintendent of Pudu Prison v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 at 497-8 (SC, Kuala
Lumpur); Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 at 67 col 1B-H. See also
LR Penna, “Pardoning power and the ‘saga’ of Sim Kie Chon” (1987) 8 Sing LR 106.
56 The characterisation of the power of pardon as a prerogative power has been criticised.
In Malaysia under Art 42 of the Federal Constitution the power of pardon is exercised on
the advice of a Pardons Board. In Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison [1985]
2 MLJ 385, the court held that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s power of pardon is a high
prerogative power. The Pardons Board only gives advice and makes no decision whatsoever.
However, Peter Crook in “Sim Kie Chon v Supt of Pudu Prison & Ors: The royal prerogative
of mercy?” (1986) 13 JMCL 195 points out that in Malaysia the discretionary power of
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to grant clemency must be derived from the Constitution and
not the common law doctrine of prerogative powers. Therefore the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
lacks discretion in the exercise of his power of clemency and must follow the advice of
the Pardons Board.
The President of Singapore’s power of pardon should similarly be seen as a constitutionally-
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in England under the common law,56 except insofar as it has been altered
by the Federal Constitution.57 At the time the Malaysian cases were decided,
it was believed that under the common law the prerogative of mercy could
not be challenged in a court of law. Authority for this proposition lay in
cases such as de Freitas v Benny,58 Hanratty v Lord Butler of Saffron
Walden59 and selected passages in Council for Civil Service Unions v
Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ case),60 which were applied by
Malaysian judges.
However, the GCHQ case actually supports the proposition that preroga-
tive powers are judicially reviewable. Lord Roskill himself pointed out that:
If the executive in pursuance of [a] statutory power does an act
affecting the rights of the citizen, it is beyond question that in principle
the manner of the exercise of that power may today be challenged.
... If the executive instead of acting under a statutory power acts under
a prerogative power... so as to affect the rights of the citizen, I am
unable to see... that there is any logical reason why the fact that the
source of the power is the prerogative and not statute should today
deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the manner of its
exercise which he would possess were the source of the power statutory.
In either case the act in question is the act of the executive. To take
of that act as the act of the sovereign savours of the archaism of past
centuries.61
This point was recently affirmed in ex parte Bentley,62 which held that
the exercise of the prerogative power of pardon is clearly reviewable:
The CCSU case [1985] AC 374 [ie, the GCHQ case] made it clear
conferred discretion and not a prerogative power. Despite some theoretical difficulty about
the status of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act (see Kevin Tan Yew Lee, “The
evolution of Singapore’s modern Constitution: Developments from 1945 to the present day”
(1989) 1 S Ac LJ 1 at 20-2), the practical view is that it forms part of our Constitution
since it is placed together with the Constitution proper and the Independence of Singapore
Agreement in volume I of the 1985 Revised Edition of the Statutes under the heading
“Constitutional Documents”.
57 See Chiow Thiam Guan v Superintendent of Pudu Prison, supra, note 55, at 119 col 1B-
D and Superintendent of Pudu Prison v Sim Kie Chon, supra, note 55, at 497 col 2B, citing
de Freitas v Benny [1976] AC 239 at 247 (PC on appeal from Trinidad and Tobago).
58 Ibid.
59 (1979) 115 Sol J 386.
60 [1985] AC 374 (HL) per Lord Diplock at 411, Lord Roskill at 418. This case was applied
in New Zealand in Burt v Governor-General [1989] 3 NZLR 64, [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA).
61 Ibid, at 417.
62 Supra, note 52.
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that the powers of the court cannot be ousted merely by invoking the
word “prerogative”. The question is simply whether the nature and
subject matter of the decision is amenable to the judicial process. Are
the courts qualified to deal with the matter or does the decision involve
such questions of policy that they should not intrude because they are
ill-equipped to do so? Looked at in this way there must be some cases
in which the exercise of the Royal Prerogative is reviewable, in our
judgment. If, for example, it was clear that the Home Secretary had
refused to pardon someone solely on the grounds of their sex, race
or religion, the courts would be expected to interfere and, in our
judgment, would be entitled to do so.... It will be for other courts to
decide on a case by case basis whether the matter in question is
reviewable or not.63
The court viewed passing references in the GCHQ case to the non-
reviewability of the prerogative of mercy as mere obiter dicta, and dis-
tinguished de Freitas v Benny64 and Hanratty65 because they were decided
before the GCHQ case at a time when it was incorrectly believed that the
exercise of prerogative power was not susceptible to judicial review at all.
Also, neither case was actually concerned with judicial review of an error
of law.66
The same result was reached in the Indian decision of Kehar Singh v
Union of India.67 Here, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to murder
the former Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on 31 October 1984.
Sentenced to death, he unsuccessfully petitioned the President of India for
a pardon under Article 72 of the Indian Constitution on the basis that the
case record showed the verdict was erroneous. His son then filed a petition
in the Supreme Court of India for judicial review of the President’s decision.
The court held68 that this case was not concerned with the merits of the
President’s decision but with the scope of his power under Article 72.
Nevertheless, it asserted that the exercise of the President’s power of pardon
cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits except within the strict
limitations defined in Maru Ram v Union of India.69 This latter case established
that the court will only examine the exercise of the power of pardon if
factors which are “wholly irrelevant, irrational, discriminatory or mala fide”
63 Ibid, at 111G.
64 Supra, note 57.
65 Supra, note 59.
66 Supra, note 52, at 111H-112A.
67 AIR 1989 SC 653.
68 Ibid, at 661 para 14.
69 AIR 1980 SC 2147.
70 Ibid, at 2174-5.
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are taken into account.70
It is submitted that ex parte Bentley and Kehar Singh reflect the law
in Singapore in the light of Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs71
which confirms that executive discretion is subject to judicial review. Hence
it is clear that the exercise of the power of pardon can be challenged by
way of judicial review. However, this will not aid a victim of a miscarriage
of justice since judicial review can only be invoked in extremely limited
circumstances. The power of pardon has evolved from an “arbitrary monarchial
right of grace and favour” to an “integral element in the criminal justice
system, a constitutional safeguard against mistakes.”72 Yet it is more
appropriately reserved for cases where the defendant is clearly guilty of
a criminal offence, but due to strong mitigating factors he or she should
be relieved from the full weight of the law.
Penalties for criminal offences in Singapore are austere. Several offences
attract a mandatory death penalty while long terms of imprisonment and
caning are specified for many others, sometimes coupled with mandatory
minimum sentences which courts must impose. Hence, regardless of the
solution ultimately adopted, there is an urgent need to shield people from
punishment without cause by rectifying this omission in our criminal justice
system.
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